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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that the Internet will cause the scope of the permitted
"fair use" of copyrighted works to shrink is plausible. This essay ex-
plores that idea.
The conception of fair use that has made the Internet relevant to
fair use was set out in an influential 1982 article by Wendy Gordon.'
She suggested that the fair use doctrine is and should be available to
protect an infringer from liability only when the infringer's use is one
that is socially beneficial and would be authorized by the copyright
owner except for the fact that transaction costs make it too costly to
seek and obtain permission for the copying. "Fair use should be
awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1)
market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is so-
cially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substan-
tial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner."2 An
illustration of this test as it might be applied to a traditional form of
fair use-the quotation of a copyrighted work in another work-is as
follows. The use of the quotation in the second work is of such little
value to the second author that it is not worth his time to locate and
communicate with the copyright owner. Yet the use of the quotation
helps the second author make the point, while it may help the first
author by acting as publicity for his work. Everyone is better off if the
quote is used, yet if permission is required the quote will not be used.
© Copyright held by Edmund W. Kitch.
* Joseph M. Hartfield Professor of Law, the University of Virginia.
1. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair-Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analy-
sis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
2. Id. at 1614.
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The fair use doctrine enables this use to occur, leaving everyone better
off.
The connection between this conception of fair use and the Internet
is the possibility that the Internet will make it easier for users of copy-
righted work to communicate with, and obtain permission from, the
copyright owner. As a result, there will be fewer situations in which
there is the market failure that in Gordon's view justifies the fair use
doctrine.
The 1994 decision of the Second Circuit in American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc.3 provided further support for the connection.
Texaco was a test case between eighty-three publishers of scientific
and technical journals against Texaco claiming that the photocopying
of articles from the journals by Texaco research scientists was copy-
right infringement. Texaco's defense was that the copying was fair
use. The court held that the copying was infringement, not fair use.4
The court's opinion by Judge Jon Newman essayed the four statutory
fair use factors, 5-the purpose and character of the use, the nature of
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used, and the effect upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
right. In connection with the last factor Texaco argued that there was
no effect on the market for the articles because there was no market
for journal articles, sold separately. In response, the plaintiffs argued
that the availability of copyright licenses authorizing copying from a
relatively new organization, the Copyright Clearance Center, or CCC,
would provide significant revenue if copying of single articles was held
not to be fair use. The court accepted this argument.
Though the publishers still have not established a conventional market for
the direct sale and distribution of individual articles, they have created, pri-
marily through the CCC, a workable market for institutional users to obtain
licenses for the right to produce their own copies of individual articles via pho-
tcopying .... [Ilt is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment
for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair
use factor when the means for paying for such a use is made easier. This
notion is not inherently troubling- it is sensible that a particular unauthorized
use should be considered "more fair" when there is no ready market or means
to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered "less
fair" when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use.6
3. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
4. See id. at 931.
5. See i d at 917 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995), which provides in part: "In determin-
ing whether the use made of a work in a particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.").
6. American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930-931.
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In September 1995 the Report of the Working Group on Intellec-
tual Property Rights of the Information Infrastructure Task Force, a
U.S. government group studying proposals for changes in legislation
in light of the rapidly developing information infrastructure or In-
ternet, commented:
Finally, it may be that technological means of tracking transactions and
licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine.
Thus, one sees in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., a court estab-
lishing liability for the unauthorized photocopying of journal articles based in
part on the court's perception that obtaining a license for the right to make
photocopies via the Copyright Clearance Center was not unreasonably
burdensome. 7
In 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
faced with the claim that copying articles and excerpts from books into
course packs for distribution to students is fair use, expressed ap-
proval of the Second Circuit's analysis of American Geophysical and
rejected the fair use claim.8 The publishers in American Geophysical
offered licenses to campus copy shops both directly and through the
Copyright Clearance Center.
In 1997 Robert Merges summarized these developments:
Digital networks call into question the assumptions that animate an im-
portant body of copyright law. In this section, I argue that because the con-
temporary fair use doctrine is predicated on a market failure rationale, and
because an electronic exchange potentially eliminates this market failure for
digital content, fair use law will significant[ly] shrink, or an alternative basis
for fair use will be rediscovered ....
... [Riecent opinions [American Geophysical and Princeton] show that if
fair use is strictly dependent on market failure, it is a concept with a very
limited future. If the market-making capacity of institutions such as the CCC
makes such a dent in market failure, digital technologies will obliterate the
fair use defense entirely. Put another way, if the fair use defense arises only
when transaction costs are prohibitive, the dramatic reduction in those costs
will give the defense a very limited role in the future. 9
7. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NA-
TIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 82 (Sept. 1995). As of February 10, 1999, this
document could be found at: <http'//www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/docipnii/
index.html>.
8. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996). "Where, on the other hand, the copyright holder clearly does have an
interest in exploiting a licensing market-and especially where the copyright
holder has actually succeeded in doing so-it is appropriate that potential licens-
ing revenues for photocopying be considered in a fair use analysis.'" Id. at 1387
(quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir.
1994)).
9. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130, 132
(1997).
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On July 13, 1999, the Copyright Clearance Center went online at
<http'/www.copyright.com>.o
Although the Texaco and Princeton University Press cases involve
literary works in an academic or scientific setting, and the web site of
the Copyright Clearance Center offers licenses principally for the
copying of written works, the basic issue of the relationship between a
more available permissions process and the scope of fair use has rele-
vance for other kinds of works as well. For instance, in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.," the Supreme Court sug-
gested that home copying of broadcast television programs by means
of a video cassette recorder for purposes of viewing them at a later
time is fair use. However, manufacturers are introducing a new gen-
eration of recorders.12 These machines are dedicated computers that
record the programs to a hard disk and use program information pro-
vided through a modem connection to manage the recording and
replay process. Such machines could easily be programmed to keep
track of the time shifting engaged in by a household and report that
information to a central site where charges could be imposed. Will
this technology mean that recording for purposes of time shifting is no
longer fair use?
H. TWO VERSIONS OF THE INTERNETS SHRINKING POWER
Is the idea that the Internet will shrink fair use simply because it
exists? That is, will fair use shrink simply because the copyright
owner could have established an Internet permission site, but chose
not to do so? I will call this version of the idea the boundary version-
that the possibility of Internet permissions affects the scope of bound-
aries of the copyright property. Or is the idea that the Internet will
shrink fair use only for uses of works for which Internet permissions
are easily available? In other words, if an Internet permission site is
not available for a work, will an "unshrunk" or even expanded version
of fair use be available as to that work? I will call this version of the
idea the privilege version-that in a particular case the availability of
Internet permissions on a reasonable basis affects the fair use "privi-
lege" of making the particular use of the copyrighted work. None of
10. See Copyright Clearance Center Announces Online Republication Licensing Ser-
vice (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http-//www.copyright.com/News/RLS.html>. The Re-
publication Licensing Service, or RLS, is only one of a number of services the
CCC offers on its website. The website has press releases dating back to 1996,
but there are no earlier releases announcing the availability of online services.
11. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
12. There are two such products, that of TiVo Inc. (manufactured and also marketed
by Phillips, and shortly by Sony as well), see <http'/www.tivo.com>, and that of
Replay Networks, see <http'J/www.replaytv.com/home>. Both products are based
on Quantum Corporation's QuickView Technology. See <http'//www.quantum.
com/products/quickview/quickview-wtb.htm>.
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the short existing discussions of this issue have suggested the possibil-
ity of these different versions, much less specified which they have in
mind. Wendy Gordon, who wrote before the Internet, clearly had in
mind the basic, structural conditions for transacting, not the particu-
lar accidents of the relationship between a particular potential in-
fringer and a particular copyright owner.1 3 The comments of Judge
Newman in Texaco and of Judge Nelson in Princeton University Press,
on the other hand, appear to be referring to an actual, existing permis-
sions process.' 4 The existence of this process enables them to say in
effect (I would guess with some relief) that "my decision does not mean
that you will be unable to copy (that scientists will be unable to make
copies of journal articles for the file, that professors will be unable to
use course packs), all it means is that you will have to pay a relatively
minor fee for permission." On the other hand, none of the discussions
make any effort to describe in any detail the terms of the permissions
process they consider relevant, suggesting that the actual details of
the permissions process are not relevant.
The words of the fair use section of the copyright statute are not
helpful on their face. The transaction cost idea is itself not to be found
in the statute, so there is naturally enough no guidance on how it is to
be applied. That does not undermine Gordon's idea, however, for it is
agreed that the statutory section is but a partial codification of a judi-
cial rule of reason. And if transaction cost conditions are relevant to
the reasonableness of copying without permission-and Gordon ap-
pears to have carried the day on this point-then there is no reason
why judges should not take them into account in their development of
the doctrine.
The issue of whether the boundary or the privilege version is the
correct one is related to basic questions of how we conceive the doc-
trine of fair use. Is "fair use" part of the definition of the boundaries of
the copyright property, so that when a court says that a defendant's
actions are fair use the court is saying "the copyright was not in-
fringed?" If so, then the boundary version would be correct, for when
the copyright owner chooses not to create an Internet permissions site,
the copyright owner is simply exercising her right, as owner, not to
license the use. Or is "fair use" a privileged form of trespass,15 so that
when a court is saying that a defendant's use is fair use the court is
saying, "the copyright was infringed, but in these particular circum-
13. See Gordon, supra note 1.
14. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996).
15. Perhaps fair use is similar to the privilege in tort law for a traveler on a public
highway who reasonably believes that the highway is impassable to enter, to a
reasonable extent and in a reasonable manner, upon neighboring land in order to
continue his journey. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 195 (1965).
[Vol. 78:880
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stances the defendant's trespass is excused"? If so, then the privilege
version would be correct, for when the copyright owner chooses not to
create an Internet permissions site, then the Internet has no rele-
vance to the reasonableness of the particular alleged infringer's fail-
ure to obtain permission to copy.
The wording of Section 107 is clear on this point. "Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [which define the exclusive
rights possessed by the owner of copyright property], the fair use of a
copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright."16 This lan-
guage treats the fair use doctrine as integral to the definition of the
property rights, requiring that people consult sections 106, 106A and
107 together to determine the boundaries of the property. Thus when
Section 106(1) confers the exclusive right "to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies,"17 that really means "to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies if the reproduction is not fair use."1 8
Despite the wording of Section 107, courts and commentators have
viewed fair use as a privilege. The Supreme Court said:
Fair use was traditionally defined as 'a privilege in others than the owner of
the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
his consent." The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copy-
right Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law doctrine. 1 9
Following the logic of this observation, the Supreme Court has said
that fair use is an affirmative defense.20 This suggests that the privi-
lege approach is the correct one and that facts specific to the particu-
lar situation are relevant to the scope of the available fair use.
One clear disadvantage of the privilege approach, and a disadvan-
tage relevant to the transaction costs involved in Internet permis-
sions, is that the privilege approach requires a court to evaluate, in
every case, the reasonableness of the Internet permission process
available in the context of the particular alleged infringement. A rea-
sonableness determination would include an evaluation of the license
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
17. Id. § 106(1).
18. The "notwithstanding" formulation of § 107 is repeated at numerous points in
§§ 108-121 of the Copyright Act. Sections 107 through 121 create numerous dif-
ferent modifications of the rights conferred by § 106. The usage of "notwithstand-
ing" in all of these sections is consistent with the construction of § 107 offered
here.
19. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (cita-
tions omitted).
20. See id. at 561; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590
(1994). This view of the fair use defense is based not on the statutory language of
the 1976 Copyright Act but on the precedents under the 1909 Act. Under the
1909 Act, fair use had no basis in the statute, and was said to be an exception and
affirmative defense. The legislative history of the 1976 Act said that Congress
did not intend to change the doctrine.
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fee offered, and would require the courts to address the kinds of ques-
tions addressed in any compulsory licensing scheme.
There is nothing in the extensive precedents and commentary on
fair use which bears on the specific question of whether a court would
look at the licensing potential of the Internet as affecting the scope of
fair use as a boundary matter, or as a privilege matter, and no conclu-
sive answer to that question is offered here. It is clear that the fair
use doctrine is strikingly fact intensive, and a very wide range of facts
indeed is potentially relevant. Some of the most insightful academic
commentators have tended to despair of any meaningful generaliza-
tions, leaving the development of the law to the common law pro-
cess. 2 1 Yet the facts one finds considered in the cases tend to be
generically specific-was the defendant a thief, how much did the de-
fendant take, for what purpose was the taking, and so on. There is no
case that suggests that George could not make use of Sam's copy-
righted work because George knew Sam, knew his phone number, and
knew he owned the copyright; so the polite and "fair" thing to do was
to call him up and ask him.
Under either approach, however, it will be necessary for the courts
to explore the question of what can be done through the Internet to
facilitate the licensing process. Under the boundary approach, a court
would have to be satisfied that it is possible through the use of the
Internet for owners of copyrights to make licenses available to poten-
tial users with minimal transaction cost. The owner of the copyright
involved in the particular case might have chosen not to set up and
operate such a site, but if it could not be done even if the owner
wanted to do it, then the Internet would not be relevant to fair use.
Under the transaction approach, a court would have to be satisfied
that the copyright owner actually set up and operated such an In-
ternet site. In either case, the actual possibilities offered by the In-
ternet are important.
III. THE TRANSACTION COST MINIMIZING INTERNET
PERMISSIONS PROCESS
What would a transaction cost minimizing, Internet-based permis-
sions process look like? Assume, for purposes of the following discus-
21. See Lloyd L. Weintreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HA.v. L. Rav. 1137, 1138 (1990) ("What is fair is as fact-specific and resistant to
generalization in this context as it is in others. Development of the doctrine of
fair use ought to proceed, therefore, not by deduction from principle but by induc-
tion from concrete cases."); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things
Change the Less They Seem "Transformed." Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J.
OF THE COPYmGHT Soc'y 251, 266 (1998) ("I am beginning to think that the only
way will be by building our set of fair use rules from the bottom up, and not from
the top down.").
[Vol. 78:880
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sion, that basic issues of Internet access and usability have been
resolved. Free (at least at the margin), fast and reliable Internet con-
nections are available everywhere. Knowledge of how to use the In-
ternet is widespread-say as widespread as knowledge of how to use
the U.S. Postal Service-and users are comfortable browsing the In-
ternet. Any reasonably prominent website is for most users only a few
clicks away. That is not the world of today, but it is not unreasonable
to assume that it will be the world of tomorrow.
Now that we are all ready to surf, what should we be able to find in
the way of copyright permissions that should make a difference to the
doctrine of fair use?
First, it would be important that there be one or a few sites to
which a user could go to find out whether Internet permission is avail-
able for a particular work. The user should not have to spend signifi-
cant amounts of time hunting for a site offering licenses for the
particular work the user wishes to use. These sites could either pro-
vide links to the copyright owners offering permissions or the permis-
sions could be offered at the site. The user should be able to search for
the work by the commonly used identifiers-author, title, publisher,
and ISBN or comparable number-and learn immediately whether or
not the work is available for licensing. The user should be able to ob-
tain this information from the site without paying a fee and without
having to provide information.
Once the user learns that a license is available, the user should
then be able to learn the terms of the license for the use that the user
wants to make of the work. For instance, if the user wants to quote
the work for a scholarly article, reprint it in a corporate magazine
with a print run of 30,000, or provide it to an academic class, the user
should be able to determine what that would cost. Then the user
should be able to make payment in a convenient form, and receive
electronic evidence that the permission has been granted. All of this
should take place promptly so that the user can decide whether to ac-
cept the license and use the work, reject the license and not use the
work, or reject the license and rely on what remains of fair use. Com-
parable processes occur routinely on today's Internet, so none of these
requirements should present any problem.
But what terms should be offered? Does the copyright owner have
to offer different prices, depending upon what use is to be made of the
work? Does it matter whether the requester is a for-profit institution
or a not for profit entity? Does it matter what the impact of the use
will be on the market for the work? How many price gradations have
to be offered? If different prices have to be offered, how much informa-
tion does the requester need to supply so that the copyright owner can
determine the price? What can the copyright owner require to verify
the information? Does the requester have to have the opportunity to
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negotiate with the copyright owner, for instance, by making offers? If
so, how rapidly does the copyright owner have to respond?
If we accept Gordon's hypothesis that the purpose of the fair use
doctrine is to make possible uses of the work where the value to the
user and the copyright owner are positive, doesn't the copyright owner
have to take account of the value to the user in her pricing? If a copy-
right owner offers to license making copies of a work at $20.00 a page
because the work may be used to brief a group of investment bankers,
does the copyright owner have to offer a lower price to an economics
professor who want to distribute copies of the same work to his sopho-
more class?
The Internet does nothing to solve the transaction cost problems of
creating and administering a licensing pricing structure and the costs
of administering such a structure in a world where licensees have in-
centives to qualify for the lowest price category.
IV. THE INTERNET SITE OF THE COPYRIGHT
CLEARANCE CENTER
We need not confine ourselves to speculation, however, since there
is a real life, functioning Internet copyright permissions website at
<http://www.copyright.com>.22 The site is that of the Copyright
Clearance Center, the not for profit organization whose existence was
mentioned in the Texaco and Princeton University Press cases.
The Copyright Clearance Center offers targeted licensing services.
For example, one service offers blanket institutional site licensing for
in-house copying of copyrighted documents like that involved in the
Texaco case. Another offers licensing for course packs like those in-
volved in the Princeton University Press case. The additional services
are described on the CCC web pages. As far as I can tell from explora-
tion of the site, the only way to find out whether or not the CCC can
quickly grant a request is to submit one and wait for a response. The
site does offer a "database of works" with a limited search capability
(no search by author is available, for instance) but that database in-
cludes price information only as to some of the works, and the fact
that a price is stated does not mean that a particular request will be
granted. In order to submit a request, users must provide a good deal
of information. Each permission is subject to explicit contractual
terms. One notable term is the condition that "Any act by User that
involves copying beyond that set forth in the notification shall be
deemed in its entirety to be an unpermitted act of copying,"23 which
appears to mean that once a requester has obtained permission to
copy some portion of a work the user cannot copy any other portion or
22. Copyright Clearance Center (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http:J/www.copyright.com>.
23. Id. at APS Terms and Conditions, cl. 2.
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copy for any other purpose, even if that copying would be fair use. As
to each permission, users agree to maintain books and records for at
least four full calendar years and to permit the CCC to audit them. If
the audit uncovers a user's underreporting or underpayment of three
percent or more, the user pays the costs of the audit.2 4 Notably, the
license is provided "as is," with no warranty that it is effective and no
indemnification if it turns out to be ineffective. 25
The CCC is not currently operating a web site that undertakes to
offer licensing for all possible fair uses of a copyrighted work. The
CCC has instead targeted specific uses which are at best questionable
candidates for fair use,2 6 uses such as the systematic production of
course packs provided in place of the purchase of educational texts, or
massive and systematic in-house copying for commercial purposes.
The CCC has generated licensing revenue by licensing uses that
would otherwise be infringing, but it has not generated, nor attempted
to generate, revenue from traditional fair use activities. Nor does the
web site attempt to provide the public with a list of works for which
permission is automatically available. As presently structured, the
CCC website appears likely to have little impact on the scope of fair
use. However, the website can be improved over time.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet can only take some of the transaction costs out of li-
censing. The costs of creating and administering a pricing system,
24. See id. at APS Terms and Conditions, cl. 8.
25. For instance, if the entity with which the CCC deals in fact does not own the
copyright and the person obtaining permission is sued by the actual owner the
CCC will not indemnify the user. The full clause is:
7. Warranty. THE WORK(S) AND RIGHT(S) ARE PROVIDED 'AS IS'.
THE RIGHTSHOLDER(S) HAS GRANTED CCC THE RIGHT TO
GRANT PERMISSION UNDER THE APS AND HAS WARRANTED
THAT IT HAS ALL RIGHTS NECESSARY TO AUTHORIZE CCC TO
ACT ON ITS BEHALF. CCC AND THE RIGHTSHOLDER DISCLAIM
ALL OTHER WARRANTIES RELATING TO THE WORK(S) AND
RIGHT(S), EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT
LIMITATION IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Id. So the user who carefully navigates the CCC website, applies for and receives
permission, and pays the fee, still has no commitment from the CCC that the
permission is valid.
26. See Copyright Clearance Center (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http'/www.copyright.
com>. This statement does not suggest that the possible applicability of fair use
did not stimulate the creation of these services. In both Texaco and Princeton
University Press there were dissenting judges (and in Princeton, the copyright
owners lost before a panel of the Sixth Circuit, a decision that was then reversed
by the court en bane). See Texaco, Inc. v. Academic Press, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d
Cir. 1994); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381 (6th Cir. 1996). Perhaps, absent these services, the cases would have come
out differently.
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combined with the follow-up steps necessary to ensure a reasonable
level of compliance with the licensing conditions, remain. These costs
are substantial. If the courts were to take a boundary view of the is-
sue, it seems unlikely that a court would conclude that any Internet
site, no matter how wondrous, effects such a potential dramatic reduc-
tion in transaction costs that the scope of fair use should significantly
shrink. If, on the other hand, a court were to take the privilege ap-
proach, and to assume the task of assessing on a case-by-case basis
whether permission was so easily available at such minimal cost that
it should have been obtained, then the very cost of that transaction by
transaction assessment would burden the process. For in each case a
potential license would have to assess whether the price and other
terms and conditions of any given licenses are so reasonable as to fore-
close fair use; and if the potential licensee chose to proceed without a
license, a court, in the event of an infringement suit, would have to do
the same thing.
